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Introduction
Salafi inspired Islamic activism has expanded rapidly since its introduction into Indonesia during the mid-1980s. Although relatively small in numbers, Salafis have created a vast network of schools, foundations, publishing houses, internet sites and radio channels whose expanse covers all corners of the archipelago. Frequently recognised by their strict adherence to conservative Islamic dress (as men wear long religious robes and women wear the niqab), they aim to literally emulate the al-Salaf al-Salih (which they regard as the first three generations of Muslims) in order to return to a true and original understanding of Islam. Their hostility to local religious and cultural practices, together with their preference to refer to scholars based in the Arabian Peninsula, distinguishes them from the majority of Indonesian Muslims -and debates as to whether they represent the 'Arabisation' of Indonesian Islam are common (Bruinessen, 2009; Hasan, 2008; Scott, 2016 ). Yet, despite the global dynamics that underline Salafism, Indonesian strands have thrived within post-authoritarian Indonesia since 1998, and have become adept at promoting their religious ideals through social media, public lectures, political alliances and the sale of commodities.
Within this paper, Salafi activism is approached as part of multi-stranded and multidirectional social movement, building upon an increasing array of literature that views both Salafism, and religious revivalist movements more broadly, as sustained efforts to challenge pre-established forms of Islamic authority and practice.
2 Indonesian Salafism is a diverse and fragmented movement, sustained not through any singular organizational structure, but shaped and transformed through the lived experiences, disagreements, and multiple ways in which it is promoted by individuals within a given locality; by which I refer to the spaces that define the everyday world of individuals not merely spatially but through a set of social interactions that can create both coherence and difference (Massey, 1994: 139) . This diversity is reflected in the growing amount of insightful literature covering Indonesian strands of Salafism. For instance, scholars have investigated the movement's history (Hassim, 2010) , socio-political mobilisation (Hasan, 2006; Jurdi, 2012) , formal educational networks (Wahid, 2014) , proselytising radio stations (Sunarwoto, 2016) , outreach programs amongst women (Nisa, 2012 (Nisa, , 2013 , and the dynamics of village based propagation (Krismono, 2015) . As these works illustrate, not only is the movement involved in a diverse range of propagational and socio-political activities, but it has flourished within Indonesia's democratic environment across the archipelagic nation.
There remains an analytical gap however. While much has been said concerning how the movement mobilises resources and builds upon political opportunities (for example, Hasan, 2006) , there is less emphasis on how activists themselves come to adapt and synthesise their faith with local and national understandings of identity, faith and modernity. This paper aims to fill this space by strengthening our understanding as to how Salafi enthusiasts adapt and frame the existential coordinates of their religious identity in relation to the socio-political forces at play within their given locality. By examining how Salafi scholars linked to the universities of Yogyakarta promote a religious ethic, this paper thus argues that they have become proficient at combining calls to the faith with references to economic progress, national development and modernity. In doing so they not only alter the dynamics of religious activism but also initiate a fundamental shift in how Salafism is represented and enacted within everyday circumstance within the university campus.
Based on ethnographic research conducted from 2011 to 2012, this paper investigates campus based da'wa (propagation) in order to understand the inner logic within the Salafism appeal to urban and campus based Islamic enthusiasts. The primary focus concerns the religious lectures organised by the student orientated Yayasan Pendidikan Islam al-Atsary (al Atsary Islamic Education Foundation, YPIA) as well as the activism of YPIA members who promote their religious ideas through independent ventures. These include the social media company Yufid, the Shari'a inspired business magazine Pengusaha Muslim (Muslim Businessman), and those involved in the creation and sale of new religious commodities such as t-shirts. This activism underlines a particular skill amongst Salafi activists to understand their environment and utilise their professional skills to further promote their religion. Furthermore, it denotes a flexibility within the concept of da'wa itself, and the sensitivity of Salafi followers to the social, economic and ideological forces that influence the lives of students. Far from being decoupled from the everyday environment of the university campuses, da'wa activists utilise references to the supposed intellectualism and progressiveness of their student audience.
Although this perhaps renders the idea of Salafism being a global and 'timeless' interpretation of Islam problematic, it emphasises how Salafism has become entangled in broader trends of Islamic revival within Indonesia, coming to promote a modern Muslim identity that is complementary to the professional aspirations of the student body.
Understanding Salafi Activism within Indonesia
Prior to elaborating upon the dynamics of contemporary religious da'wa amongst Yogyakartan students, it is important to describe what I mean when evoking the term 'Salafi.'
What is referred to here as Salafism has spread across the archipelago since the 1980s, forming a framework of educational establishments (Hasan, 2010b; Wahid, 2014) , as well as playing a crucial role in post-Suharto sectarian violence via the Laskar Jihad (Hasan, 2006) .
However, providing a definitive account of the movement is no easy task; at present, there are at least five different networks in Indonesia, who frequently denounce each other by drawing from the same religious resources. 3 Moreover, despite growing literature pertaining to the Salafi movement both globally (Koning, 2007; Meijer, 2009 ) and within Indonesia specifically (Hasan, 2006 (Hasan, , 2007 (Hasan, , 2008 (Hasan, , 2010a (Hasan, , 2010b ICG, 2004; Nisa, 2012 Nisa, , 2013 Sunarwoto, 2016; Wahid, 2014) , the use of the term remains somewhat obscure. Not only does Salafi denote an important reference to Islamic history, deriving from al-Salaf or 'those 3 A preliminary list of these poles within the movement includes: those who follow scholars such as Abu Nida, Yazid bin Abdul Qadir Jawas, Faiz Asifuddin and Aunur Rafiq Ghufron, who are the main focus of this article; former followers of Jafar Umar Thalib linked to Luqman Ba'abduh, Muhammad as-Sewed and Ayip Syafruddin; former followers of Jafar Umar Thalib linked to Dzulqarmain, who was in charge of fatwa for Laskar Jihad; former followers of Jafar Umar Thalib linked to Abu Thurob al-Jawi; those affiliated with the Makassar based religious organisation Wahdah Islamiyah. While not the focus of this article, it is interesting to note that fragmentation has been most common amongst those formerly linked to Laskar Jihad, as these groups more commonly engage in activities that discredit the legitimacy of other Salafis (Sunarwoto, 2016) .
who came before us', 4 but traced genealogically references to the 'Salafi' saturate the work of some of the earliest Muslim scholars, most notably al-Bukhari (810-870), and Al-Awza'i (707-774) (Hassim, 2010) . Accordingly, the al-Salaf al-Salih (pious ancestors) command respect and inspiration amongst Muslims.
Within this paper the term will be limited to a loose but specific reformist movement that aims to closely emulate the first three generations of Muslims, the Sahaba, Tabi'un and Tabi' al-Tabi'in (Hasan, 2007) . As LIPIA's alumni network expanded it became a vital conduit through which Salafi literature was translated and disseminated. The growth of the Salafi movement in Indonesia has gained increasing scholastic and media coverage, especially from the post-Suharto era onwards (Hasan, 2006 (Hasan, , 2007 (Hasan, , 2008 (Hasan, , 2010b Hassim, 2010; ICG, 2004; Jurdi, 2007 Jurdi, , 2012 Nisa, 2012 Nisa, , 2013 Wahid, 2014) . These studies have provided valuable insight upon which we can further our understanding of Salafism.
Eeqbal Hassim has, for example, provided a perceptive study discussing the foundational moments of the movement within the LIPIA and DDII, and how it differs -both theologically and socially -from Indonesia's larger Islamic organisations such as Muhammadiyah (Hassim, 2010) . A more contemporary study of the movement has been undertaken by Din
Wahid, whose extensive research provides insight into the evolution of Salafi pesantren (religious schools) in Indonesia, how they obtain funds, what materials they teach to their students and how they disseminate the Salafi manhaj (method) (Wahid, 2014) . Eva Nisa has additionally advanced understanding of Salafism by focusing on recruitment and the ethical dilemma's faced by women Salafi reverts in Yogyakarta (Nisa, 2012) . Meanwhile Syarifuddin Jurdi has also provided a thorough account of the Salafi inspired Islamic organisation, Wahdah Islamiyah, an organisation with over 120 branches across the nation (Jurdi, 2012 century (Hasan, 2006 (Hasan, 2006) . As Hasan continues, these scholars received DDII sponsored religious training both in Saudi Arabia and in LIPIA, and upon completing their studies, tapped into a network of university campuses and DDII affiliated schools in urban centres such as Yogyakarta, Makassar, Solo, Semarang and Jakarta, in order to find employment (Hasan, 2006) . Building upon social movement theories, Hasan thus underlines how the movement mobilised resources and utilised political opportunities so as to gain prominence within Indonesia.
As informative as Hasan and other scholastic works cited above are, little has been said concerning how Salafi agents themselves come to adapt and synthesise their faith with local and national understandings of identity, faith and modernity. It is on this issue that this paper aims to build upon and contribute to our understanding of Salafism. In order to do so this Wadud, who preached amongst high school and university students and opened the Islamic clothing store Ihya in 1994. However, arguably the most notorious of these preachers was Jafar Umar Thalib, who was initially invited to the city by Abu Nida, but became hostile to the latter's perceived willingness to work with non-Salafi organisations (such as the DDII).
Jafar Umar Thalib would go on to form the 7,000 strong Laskar Jihad (Jihad Brigade) that would participate in sectarian conflict in Maluku during the early 2000s. During the 1990s he became one of Abu Nida's fiercest critics and followers of these two preachers were vocal opponents of each other, with their condemnation of the other often leading to confrontations outside mosques. The divide between the two remains to this day, but hostility -either verbal or through direct conformation -is rare.
The history of Jafar Umar Thalib has been well documented by Hasan and security experts (Hasan, 2006; ICG, 2004) . In contrast, the networks of Abu Nida, and how they have evolved since the resignation of Suharto in 1998, have received relatively less attention, and it is to these that this paper turns. Indeed, the university campus provided Abu Nida with the necessary space and locality in which to recruit young followers, but in doing so his propagational activism intersected with a broader interest in Islam amongst university students and younger upwardly mobile Muslims. These individuals had benefited from the economic and educational opportunities made available by the New Order, but rejected the political ideology and authoritarian practices of the regime (Effendy, 2003; Hefner, 2000; Latif, 2005) . These university educated Muslims had begun to re-engage with Islamic values to navigate the challenges of society, leading to the increased popularity of both nationally orientated Islamic intellectualism commonly referred to as 'Civil Islam' (Hefner, 2000) , as well as global Islamic scholarship such as Salafism. It is the intersectionality of the Salafi ethic with the broader emphasis on university education and creation of a modern society, which this study explicitly analyses, and to which it aims to build on the abovementioned literature concerning Salafism in Indonesia. Indeed, there remains a need to examine how Salafi activists come to adapt and synthesise their faith with local and national understandings of identity, faith and modernity.
Campus Lectures and the Yayasan Pendidikan Islam al-Atsary
The resignation of Suharto in 1998 and subsequent political reformasi allowed Abu Nida's atTurots foundation to expand its activism apace. In 2000 they opened their flagship educational establishment, the Islamic Centre Bin Baz, which was later complemented by a nearby medical school, as well as a hospital. 7 By 2012 they had also trained over 1,400 preachers who have been sent across Java and Indonesia to spread the Salafi message.
Furthermore, at-Turots affiliated preachers were pivotal in organising several student orientated lectures, foundations and religious programs, which would later take on an independence of their own. Of particular concern here is the June 2012).
Yudi was not the only one who mentioned the importance of lectures, as several other informants I spoke to also referred to its importance in their reversion. Indeed, for informants, an important aspect of the appeal of lectures relates to its 'everyday' relevance, which foregrounds a preference to understand religion in relation to one's life through muhasabah over more scriptural forms of Islamic learning. Furthermore, these lectures, while often introductory, provided a first step to more intensive learning through structured classes, acting as 'obligatory points of passage' through which one familiarises oneself with the movement, its doctrine and activists. 9 More experienced students and preachers would act as guides for newcomers, assisting them in personal matters as well as providing information on further learning.
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I observed one YPIA weekly lecture at a Musholla (prayer hall) close to UGM's Medical Studies faculty. The Musholla is a moderately sized two-storey building, with the ground floor reserved for men and the upstairs for women. These classes were led by Ustadz Solahudin (pseudonym), a teacher at the at-Turot's ICBB. A polite and amiable individual, Solahudin is a former UGM student himself and had received a BA from UGM's pharmacy 9 This phrase 'obligatory points of passage' derives from the work of Michel Callon who uses it in relation to actor network theory to stress a point through which actors are forced to converge on a certain topic and/or purpose. My use of the phrase loosely converges with this idea of passage although I envisage it as a physical space where actors engage with each other rather than a potential group of actors or problems one must pass through in a given network. For further information see, Callon, 1986) 10 Crucially, such observations are hardly unique to Salafism, as comradery has become a key characteristic of contemporary Islamic revivalism more broadly. For further examples of the role of halaqah or study circles see : Bruinessen, 2002; Mahmood, 2005. department before studying at the Daar al-Hadits Institute in Yemen (a popular centre for Salafi study) for 4 years. His lectures did not attract a particularly big audience, and so he addressed approximately 12 males and an unknown number of females per week (I could not ascertain this information given strict gender segregation). These participants were students from the medical department, predominantly in their early twenties and who were new to Islamic classes.
Solahudin would sit cross-legged in front of a microphone and knee-high table with the audience sitting around him in a semi-circle with their Qur'an, notebooks and textbooks in hand. They would follow a prepared syllabus titled Nutrisi Hati (Nutrition for the Heart), which was, in terms of religious sciences and content, simple. The premise was to inculcate a basic understanding and enthusiasm for Islam that would provide the first initial steps into a wider web of Salafi piety. There was an urge to engage in personal muhasabah in order to instil the true values of aqida, tawhid and thus follow 'true' Islam by becoming taqwa (fear and love of God). Yet, such religious tenets were frequently combined with an emotive appeal that greater piety would not only save oneself from judgement day, but also pave the way to overcoming the social ills and moral corruptions he believed plagued Indonesian society.
For instance, in March 2012, when the wider student community was involved in demonstrations against a planned government fuel hike, Solahudin argued that such worldly concerns only help cause friction amongst the umma as well as detract from one's concentration on religious obligations (Observation, Yogyakarta, 27 March 2012). Similarly, several weeks later, he joked about the public frenzy surrounding several deaths linked to the tomcat (rove beetle), believing that while such deaths were unfortunate, one should prepare for them by turning to religion rather than 'gossiping' and making demands upon the government (Observation, Yogyakarta, 10 April 2012). Importantly, he did not condemn the activities of students outright, but referred to the university as a place of contradictory forces.
On the one hand, it was un-Islamic as it encouraged the mixing of the sexes, and so distracted men from both their studies and religious duty. Yet, on the other hand, it was a space and opportunity within which people could engage freely with religion and receive an education;
an important requirement if one wanted to better the place of Muslims in society (Observation, Yogyakarta, 30 May 2012).
As the lecture series progressed, it became clear the 'secular' university campus and Islam were reconciled by a need to build a modern and forward looking society based on 'timeless' Islamic values. Solahudin began to refer to the audience as a community of scholars who needed to assist each other in guarding against desire and adhering to religious principles.
They were, in his words, a Majlis (council) who were evidently on their path of religious piety -but who should also come together to improve society through their own education as well as more practical ability to provide assistance to less-well off individuals. It was notable that over time the number of male members decreased slightly but that those that remained became more confident in asking questions publically to Solahudin. They also began to pray together in a style specific to Salafi doctrine, adopt religious dress and grow their facial hair.
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Several began expressing an interest in continuing to learn about Islam, and so were advised where else to find lectures or information by a YPIA affiliated third-year medical student, who was there to act as a guide for potential new members (Interview, Yogyakarta, 19 April 2012). They were thus beginning to forge relations to the movement that could shift the ways they approached society and religious practice, and the lecture provided an important space in which this shift occurred and was given substance. The focal point of these lectures was the necessity to inculcate religious principles but this was always linked to inherently modern choices and lifestyles rather than being solely scholastic. The emphasis was on discovering how and why to 'live' Islam in line with the potential anxieties of 'being a modern forward looking Muslim' in Indonesia.
Da'wa, Social Media and Ideas of Business
Salafi campus lectures are complemented by an ever-expanding range of da'wa activities that rely on the skills, manpower and ideas of students and ex-students. If Islamic learning is one pivotal pillar to becoming a pious Salafi, being able to conduct da'wa in one's community is
another. Yet, as Eickelman and Piscatori remind us, da'wa is not a neutral or solely objective activity, but bound to a particular time and place (Eickelman & Piscatori, 1996) . YPIA members are required to participate in the foundation's outreach programs, although they have also used their own initiative to create websites and Islamic commodities through which they aim to promote Salafi principles. Accordingly, da'wa amongst those affiliated with the urban Salafi movement has come to comprise religious commodities, including magazines, social media and clothing outlets (to name but a few) that are informed by broader notions of popular culture within university campuses.
It is not only the format of da'wa that has changed however, but also the content. There is increasingly a concern for what informants describe as 'thematic issues' (isu thematik, or kajian thematik) relating to particularly topical events or themes popularised in the media or society. This is evident in the outreach work of the YPIA, which distributes the weekly bulletin, At-Tauhid, outside mosques throughout the city every Friday. At-Tauhid consists of 4-6 pages printed on cheap A5 paper, and provides a space for students to write about issues they believe to be of concern. For example, Indonesian youth (Habib, 2012) . Indeed, it underlines how the substance of da'wa relates to society and is embedded in public debates occurring at the time.
The space At-Tauhid provides students is gradually being eclipsed by social media and internet platforms however. Its repertoire relates to numerous themes of socio-political concern, such as the plight of Muslims in Indonesia in light of natural disasters, the perceived lack of real piety within Indonesia, as well as global events like the Syrian civil war. Not shying away from slang or the use of professional editing (which includes background music, fading and cutting to 12 Valentine's Day has frequently been an issue around which religious conservatives hold annual demonstrations, berating it as Christian, Jewish, Secular or even just a 'sex holiday.' For example, see: Gade, 2013; JakartaPost, 2014; Telegraph, 2013. 13 To do so it utilised a Google Custom Search Platform to comb across multiple sites that are part of an ever-increasing database of virtual sources whose 'Salafi-ness' can be confirmed by Yufid's network of employees and associated preachers. relates to a broader concern that piety, economic aspiration and religious consumption can necessarily come together to bring worldly successes for both an individual and society.
The perceived success of Yufid and the YBPM is linked to the creation of what Bonnefoy has termed 'moral entrepreneurs' (Bonnefoy, 2011) , which refers to those who encourage their specific religious ideals through the idea of Muslim business in the modern capitalist market. 16 They tap into processes of religious commodification that have become ever more popular amongst urban Indonesian Muslims (Fealy, 2008; Hasan, 2009 Hasan, , 2011 Jones, 2007; Lukens-Bull, 2008; Muzakki, 2008) . Indeed, Salafis are adept at promoting their religious principles through an array of commodities such as t-shirts, bags, stickers and badges, which mix popular imagery and religious quotations (which are often advertised on Yufid websites or within Pengusaha Muslim). YPIA affiliated students have thus been at the forefront of creating their own religious products such as distro clothing. Briefly stated, distro, as a concept, is the sale of cheaply made t-shirts and fashion that frequently rearranges the logos of multinational companies to include catchy phrases or humorous alterations. It originated from the underground punk music scene in Bandung in 1993 and provided a form of selfpromotion through collectively owned outlets that doubled as forums through which music and political issues could be discussed (Uttu, 2006) . By 2003 distro exploded into the 16 Bonnefoy is not alone in noting the confluence of business ethics and Islamic faith in Indonesia. Indeed, this topic has been covered more extensively by Rudnyckyj (2009a; 2009b) .
mainstream as student designers -often from more well-off backgrounds and benefiting from better technology than their punk forerunners -were able to replicate and reconstruct global labels.
By 2006 Islam' within society, and it is to this deeper evolution I now wish to turn.
A Modern Muslim Identity
I now wish to further elaborate on the broader implications of what campus lectures, social media and Islamic business mean to our understanding of contemporary Salafi activism. As described above, on a methodological plane it underlines a dexterity amongst activists to align and promote their faith through practical mediums that appeal to young urban Muslims. Yet, substantively, it also denotes a fundamental shift in Salafi doctrine. Those examined in this paper enact what Bayat terms an 'active piety' to promote religious doctrine (Bayat, 2007: 150) , and in doing so they have brought topical issues that arise within the Indonesian university campus front and centre to how Salafism is understood. By bridging between one's search for piety and the anxieties of living a modern ethical and successful lifestyle, activists have changed the very orientation of the movement. In social movement literature this transformation is understood through the concept of frame alignment, where agents can bridge, amplify and transform a movement's message in order to achieve resonance amongst constituents (Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986) . However, framing is not only symbolic but can affect the very orientation of a movement (Zald, 1996) . Although Salafis rely on the Islamic works of scholars in Saudi Arabia, the everyday experiences of members themselves shift and alter the movement's dynamics to give it a unique and local flavour.
The above analysis has elaborated on several instances where activists reflect on everyday examples of student protests to provide an emotive appeal for correct religious faith that simultaneously intersects with a deeper ideological understanding of action, progress and Within the national discourses of development, the kampung represents a bastion of timeless Indonesian culture, and a space from which students believed they had to distance themselves in order to become part of modern society. This was especially true during the Suharto New
Order, where the kampung was used to legitimise political and economic policies as well as class distinctions, becoming what Bourchier has referred to as a form of 'conservative indigenism' (Bourchier, 1998) . Indonesian culture, through the kampung, was promoted as being communalistic, harmonious and so reinforced Javanese aristocratic notions of statecraft.
Indeed, as Sullivan noted, the kampung evoked an image of the Javanese village and its apparent loyalty to the royal court was an often-utilised image and a source of political legitimacy during the New Order (Sullivan, 1992) .
Differentiations between the kampung and the campus permeate da'wa amongst the YPIA and their Salafi associates. While I have previously focused exclusively on the YPIA's campus activism in this paper, it is notable that many of their activists are also involved in rural based religious activities and welfare programs. They provide basic religious classes to children living in villages on the outskirts of Yogyakarta, and the YPIA also runs an 'Islamic
Centre Merapi' -a relief centre that was formed in the aftermath of the 2010 Merapi volcanic eruption and has since gone on to offer basic education to surrounding rural communities.
However, such activism varies greatly when compared to campus learning. In rural communities, da'wa includes handing out a number of A6 size buku saku (pocket books) that provide summaries of major religious works. These pocket books offer simple descriptions of religious practices, such as salat (prayer), wudu (ritual washing before prayer), and proper dress through bullet points and explanatory diagrams. For example, the buku saku version of
Sifat Shalat Nabi (Ways of Prayer According to the Prophet) by Shaykh Mohammad Nasir alDin al-Albani is a mere 50 pages while the 'full' edition that students at the YPIA are required to read is over 250 pages. songkok (a black traditional hat). The residing preacher, who was a teacher at the Salafi Pesantren al-Irsyad in nearby Salatiga, was light-hearted, mild and polite. While critical of contemporary society he delved little into world politics, preferring to look at welfare, behaviour and social justice. For example, in a lecture given just before Ramadan he asked the audience to 'moralise' their religious practice (mengikhlaskan ibada) so as to assist in building an ethical society (Observation, Sawangan, 15 July 2012). Sensitive to the composition of his audience, he also occasionally switched from Indonesian to Javanese, most notably when he wished to find a catchphrase that could summarise a particular issue he was reflecting upon. He forwent any dialogical exchange with the audience to focus on the need to correct ibada (Islamic practice) and muamala (social relations). The nuances of this message differed from the urban lecture as, rather than pushing the audience to think of themselves as a 'saved' group, the stress was on good morality and touched little on national socio-political issues. When he did touch on society, his repertoire was different from that seen on the campus, as he talked about the problem of crime and alcohol abuse amongst the village youth, rather than promoting the need for an Islamic modern society. Furthermore, these sessionsunlike lectures within the campus -did not include any question and answer session, allegedly because of fears this could lead to an audience member hijacking the event to promote a 'political' agenda.
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Urban Salafi activists, in comparison, see themselves as part of a growing progressive and professional milieu that combines their piety with a broader desire to be modern members of an educated class. They are, in this regards, part of a more fundamental shift that has occurred amongst Muslim professionals within Indonesia. The influx of consumer goods and greater level of social mobility amongst university educated Muslims has come to inform and facilitate the very concepts upon which an outward religious identity transects with ideas of modern belonging. Salafis tailor their consumption patterns and da'wa, selecting preachers and the magazines or websites they access so as to socially demarcate themselves as members of a particular segment of the Salafi movement, which is educated and modern. As both Hasan and Muzakki have argued, Islam in Indonesia has become a symbolic commodity that is selected by followers in order to reify their own identity within a social group (Hasan, 2009 (Hasan, , 2011 Muzakki, 2008) . The very process of picking and consuming goods becomes 19 Moreover, the lack of questions, I believe, was linked to a general uncertainty as to how an Ustadz would be received in such an environment. Questions necessarily open the door for representatives of 'local' Islamic practice to critique them. At one further event I attended in Yogyakarta, a local Kyai, while respectful and in general agreement with Salafi principles, created a degree of confusion and embarrassment by using several Javanese phrases that the Ustadz could not understand. It caused a level of furore amongst the audience and underlines the challenges experienced by preachers in gaining local credibility and the risk they run in encountering hostility (Observation, Yogyakarta, 15 February 2012) .
representational of how one defines both one's 'religious' identity and one's social and economic class (Fealy, 2008) . 20 Campus based Salafi activists thus demarcate themselves from rural segments of the movement and Muslim population, and the use of religious commodities and explicit reference to the kampung sets them apart from other Salafi Muslims in this regards.
Importantly, this is not unique to religion as both Schulte-Nordholt and Dick have pointed out that the consumption of specific goods and products has, historically speaking, acted as a crucial marker through which middle classes in Indonesia have come to identify themselves as such (H. W. Dick, 1985; H.W. Dick, 1990; Schulte-Nordholt, 2011 ). Yet, it nevertheless represents a fundamental and qualitative shift in Indonesian Islamic expression, and a significant development within the Salafi movement specifically. Salafi campus activists may draw from the same scriptural references as their rural Salafi counterparts, but the ability to utilise social media and create religious commodities has led them in a vastly different direction, envisioning their movement as something that is not just engaged with society, but also part of a broader professional Muslim society. They thus represent a re-articulation of Salafi doctrine, aiming to return to an 'original' Islam that both saves oneself and provides a solution to the social and economic ills of contemporary society.
Conclusion
The development of new forms of Salafi activism amongst students and graduates underlines the diverse ways Salafism has developed since its inception in Indonesia over 30 years ago.
While this paper is limited to a number of specific student based foundations and industries such as the YPIA and Yufid -and so is in no way representative of the broader Salafi movement in its totality -it provides a case study as to how urban Salafi activists have become adept at transforming both the substance and form of their religious propagation in contemporary Indonesia. In line with broader trends of Islamic revival across the archipelago, Salafis are busy constructing radio stations, online social media services, and commodities that promote an Islamic identity. However, such activism signifies both personal faith and membership to a social class. The vocabulary of development and modernity is apparent here, denoting the differences between the kampung and the educated and urban environments in which such activism is based. This does not imply that rural communities are secondary to Salafi activism; indeed, other studies of Salafism make it clear that rural Java remains one of the most active areas for Salafi foundations. Yet, for urban and campus activists, Salafi values, which remain sensitive to concerns within a given locality, have been reframed as a solution to the challenges of modern life.
